Many behavioral phenomena, including underweighting of rare events and probability matching, can be the product of a tendency to rely on small samples of experiences. Why would small samples be used, and which experiences are likely to be included in these samples? Previous studies suggest that a cognitively efficient reliance on the most recent experiences can be very effective. We explore a very different and more cognitively demanding process explaining the tendency to rely on small samples: exploitation of environmental regularities. The first part of our study shows that across wide classes of dynamic binary choice environments, focusing only on experiences that followed the same sequence of outcomes preceding the current task is more effective than focusing on the most recent experiences. The second part of our study examines the psychological significance of these sequence-based rules. It shows that these tractable rules reproduce well-known indications of sensitivity to sequences and predict a nontrivial wavy recency effect of rare events. Analysis of published data supports this wavy recency prediction, but suggests an even wavier effect than these sequence-based rules predict. This pattern, and the main behavioral phenomena documented in basic decisions from experience and probability learning tasks, can be captured with a similarity-based model assuming that people follow sequences of outcomes most of the time but sometimes respond to trends. We conclude with theoretical notes on similarity-based learning.
Previous research shows that many behavioral phenomena can be explained with the assertion that people, and other animals, tend to rely on small samples of past experiences (see Erev & Barron, 2005; Fiedler, 2000; Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; Kareev, 2000; Rakow & Newell, 2010; Selten & Chmura, 2008; Shafir, Reich, Tsur, Erev, & Lotem, 2008; Ungemach, Chater, & Stewart, 2009) . One example is the underweighting of rare events pattern documented in repeated choice tasks like the one described in Figure 1 . Experience with the task in Figure 1 leads most people to prefer an action associated with the bad gamble "a loss of 10 with probability 0.1; a gain of 1 otherwise" (expected loss of 0.1) over the status quo (payoff of zero with certainty). According to one possible depiction of the decision process, people sample from memory experiences with each of the options and choose the option with the higher sample average. If the sample size is small enough (in this example, six or less experiences is a sufficiently small sample), the sample from the action choice will not include, in most cases, the rare Ϫ10 loss, and the sample will have a positive average. Hence, reliance on a small sample of experiences leads people to behave as if they underweight the rare event, which in this example, leads to deviation from maximization.
Another example for a behavioral phenomenon implied by the tendency to rely on small samples is a bias toward probability matching (Estes, 1950; Grant, Hake, & Hornseth, 1951; Shanks, Tunney, & McCarthy, 2002) documented in guessing (or probability learning) tasks like the one presented in Figure 2 . Maximization in this task implies always guessing the more frequently appeared (70% chance) color. Probability matching implies that the choice rate of the 70% chance color would be 70%. The observed choice rates in these tasks tend to fall between maximization and probability matching (see reviews in Lee, 1971; Vulkan, 2000) . Like those in Figure 1 , these results can be captured with the assumption that subjects rely on small samples. For example, relying on a sample of four previous experiences (and guessing the color more common in these experiences) implies the guessing of the 70% event in 78% of the trials (Erev & Barron, 2005) .
Past studies have suggested many possible contributors to the tendency to rely on small samples. For example, reliance on small samples is likely to emerge because it reduces memory load (Barron & Erev, 2003; Kareev, 2000) , saves time (Fox & Hadar, 2006; Hertwig et al., 2004) , and simplifies the choice task (Fiedler, 2000; Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010) . Moreover, in many natural environments (particularly in highly autocorrelated settings), forgetting, and relying on small sets of the most recent experiences, can be very effective (e.g., Anderson & Schooler, 1991; Schooler & Hertwig, 2005) . Although these suggested contributors differ in their focus-some focus on the cognitive costs of using much information and others focus on the potential benefits of using little information-they commonly agree that the learning processes that lead to reliance on small samples require limited memory and lead to positive recency effects (i.e., to responses corresponding with recent outcomes). In the current paper, we show that reliance on small samples, and the behavioral phenomena that it implies, can also emerge from a process that requires heavy use of long term memory and does not imply positive recency. Specifically, we suggest that reliance on small samples can emerge from an attempt to respond to dynamic settings with repeated regularities.
Recall the problem in Figure 1 and consider, for example, a couple contemplating whether to go to an Italian restaurant on a Friday night. Assume that they have 10 past experiences with the restaurant: nine experiences were good (payoff of ϩ1), but one was very poor (payoff of Ϫ10). A decision to go the restaurant anyway reflects behavior that appears as reliance on small samples. Under one explanation for their behavior, they neglected the poor experience, maybe due to forgetting. However, if the only poor experience was on a Wednesday, when a different (and an inadequate) chef heads the kitchen, their decision can also reflect a clever effort to adapt to a changing environment (i.e., an environment in which the probability of a poor experience can change in time). On one hand, it could very well be that the poor experience they had on a Wednesday is irrelevant to the current decision made on a Friday, and their behavior, which appears as reliance on small samples, is productive. On the other hand, if the actual probability for a very poor experience is independent on the day of the week, the couple's oversophistication leads them to base a decision on fewer experiences than optimal. Considering the fact that participants of an experiment, such as that described in Figure  1 , do not know with certainty the underlying dynamics (e.g., whether the environment is static or dynamic), the same process (adaptation to repeated regularities) can account for their observed behavior.
We use the term dynamic environments to refer to choice problems in which there are several states of nature that determine the possible outcomes, and the transitions between the states can be described by a stationary Markov chain (which is unknown to the agent). Because the outcomes of the current decision depend on the current state of nature, it can be optimal in these settings to rely on past experiences only in the current state and ignore experiences in other states. However, it can also be very difficult to identify these experiences. For example, Figure 3 presents three distinct Markov chains that could each describe the actual environment in which the restaurant decision described previously
The current experiment includes many trials. Your task, in each trial, is to click on one of the two keys presented on the screen. Each click will be followed by the presentation of both keys' payoffs. Your payoff for the trial is the payoff of the selected key. Figure 1 . The instructions screen in Nevo and Erev's (2012) study of decisions from experience using the "clicking paradigm." The participants did not receive a description of the payoff distributions. The feedback after each choice included the payoff from the payoff distributions associated with each of the two keys. One key always paid zero (the status quo payoff). The other, "action," key was a bad (negative expected value) gamble that led to a loss of 10 in 10% of the trials, and to a gain of 1 in the other trials, denoted (Ϫ10, 0.1; ϩ1). The experiment lasted 100 trials. The choice rate of the bad gamble was 58%. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
The current experiment includes many trials. Your task, in each trial, is to guess which of two colors, Red or Blue, will appear on the screen next. Each guess will be followed by an appearance of one of two colors. In each trial, you will gain 2 Agoras if you have guessed correctly, but you will lose 2 Agoras otherwise. Figure 2 . A typical instructions screen in Bereby-Meyer and study of a probability learning task. Unbeknownst to participants, one of the two possible colors appeared on the screen in 70% of the trials. The experiment lasted 500 trials. In the first 100 trials, the choice rate of the more frequent color was 73% and the total choice rate of the frequent event was 83%. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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takes place. In Chain Static, it is virtually impossible to discover which experiences occurred in which state and attempts to do so are likely to lead to deviations from maximization. (Notice this chain also describes the payoffs from the gamble in the problem in Figure 1 ). In contrast, in Chain Cycle and Chain Repetition, it is possible to use the structure of the environment to discover the most relevant experiences to the current decision. In Chain Cycle, the state is determined by the day of the week; hence relying on experiences in the same or in similar days can be optimal. In Chain Repetition, the probability of staying in the same state is much larger than the probability of a switch, hence relying on the most recent experiences and ignoring old ones can be optimal. That is, relying on a (possibly small) sample of past experiences can be very effective in settings like those of chains Cycle and Repetition but not in settings like that of Chain Static. As noted previously, several previous studies have shown the potential benefits of relying on small samples in dynamic environments similar to Chain Repetition in Figure 3 (i.e., environments in which the probability to get an outcome similar to the previous one is relatively high). For example, analyses of animal behavior have suggested that taking into account a small number of the most recent experiences facilitates detection of environmental change and can thus enhance performance (e.g., Cuthill, Kacelnik, Krebs, Haccou, & Iwasa, 1990; McNamara & Houston, 1985 Shafir & Roughgarden, 1994) . The current study extends these studies by considering more general forms of the underlying Markov chain. It shows that concentrating on the most recent experiences is not always the best strategy. Sometimes the opposite strategy, recalling earlier experiences and disregarding recent ones, can lead to improved performance. For example, if the underlying environment for the restaurant decision is similar to Chain Cycle, even if the poor experience occurred in the most recent visit to the restaurant, disregarding it (on account that it was on a Wednesday), and relying on earlier visits, can be optimal.
Our analysis begins with a focus on a large class of dynamic settings, which is a broad extension of the typical class of problems examined in previous studies of decisions from experience. In particular, we study choice tasks like that in Figure  1 , but allow the probabilities of the outcomes of the action button to change from trial to trial in accordance with a Markov process.
1 Under this extension, the very limited information available to the decision makers makes it extremely difficult to find the optimal strategy. In a computational analysis, we examine the properties and performance of several learning rules decision makers can apply given the available information in these settings. We show that in many situations, the optimal strategy can be approximated by using contingent average rules. These rules use all past experiences, but put focus on those that appear to be most relevant to the current contingency-just as the aforementioned couple recalled all their experiences from the restaurant, but focused on those that appeared relevant for a decision made on a Friday. The results reveal that a decision maker who uses contingent average rules will approximate the optimal behavior in the wide class of settings, but will behave as if she relies on only a small sample of experiences. In addition, the results imply that in a small subset of settings that was the focus of decisions from experience research thus far (when the environment is static), using these rules can also result in behavior that reflects underweighting of rare events and probability matching. That is, our computational analysis shows that the use of contingent average rules is a sufficient condition for behavior that appears as reliance on small samples 1 Although it generalizes previous decisions from experience research, this class of settings is a subset of a larger class of dynamic settings in which the agent's actions can affect future choice, for example by modifying the environment (Busemeyer, 1999; Rapoport, 1975 Repetition Figure 3 . Three examples for a stationary Markov chain representing a dynamic environment that underlies a choice task. Each circle represents a "state of nature." The outcome (payoff) in each state is given inside its circle. Numbers near the arrows represent the probabilities of transition from state to state. Assume transitions are made once a day. Chain Cycle describes a setting in which the state is dependent on the day of the week. Chain Static describes a static setting in which the outcome distribution does not change in time. Chain Repetition describes a setting in which repetition of the previous outcomes are highly likely. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
and the behavioral phenomena it implies, specifically underweighting of rare events and bias toward probability matching. Contingent average rules approximate optimal behavior in a wide class of settings, but they are also cognitively demanding. For example, although the number of possible contingencies can be high, the contingent average rules imply that decision makers remember the average payoff for any given contingency. In the second part of the current investigation, we show that in spite of their cost, contingent average rules have appealing descriptive value. Analysis of data from published studies of decisions from experience in static settings reveals robust sequential dependencies that were ignored by previous research. For example, the results show that the tendency to underweight a rare event is strongest three trials after its occurrence. Comparison with other learning models that capture the underweighting of rare events pattern reveals that the contingent average rules fit the observed sequential dependencies better.
Our analysis concludes with a presentation of a thought experiment that clarifies the relationship between the contingent average hypothesis and the assertion that people try to respond to sequential patterns. It suggests that people can be sensitive to many forms of contingent average rules. They tend to use rules that imply high sensitivity to sequential patterns when the available information is limited to previous outcomes, but are likely to ignore the sequential pattern when it is easy to use other, more reliable, signals.
Response to a Dynamic Environment: Computational Investigation
We study a space of binary choice tasks in which an agent repeatedly chooses between a status quo option that provides zero with certainty and an action that provides either a gain or a loss contingent on the state of nature. The state of nature is determined by a stationary Markov chain, which includes some good states that provide the same positive payoff and some bad states that provide the same negative payoff. The agent does not know the payoff rule nor the transition probabilities and only gets as feedback the payoffs each option provided in previous trials (i.e., both the obtained and the forgone payoffs are given).
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Most previous studies of decisions from experience focus on a static subset of this space of choice tasks in which the probabilities of gain and loss in the next trial are always the same. This may happen if, for example, all the rows in the transition probabilities matrix are identical (Biele, Erev, & Ert, 2009 , and see Chain Static in Figure 3 ). Our analysis vastly extends previous research by allowing the probabilities to change from trial to trial. We start by focusing on the simplest nontrivial generalization in which this is possible, chains with four states (see Figure 4) . Two states provide the same gain and two states provide the same loss, hence the agent can never use the available information, the previous outcomes, to infer with certainty the current state of nature. We subsequently remove this four-state constraint.
Agents who know the payoff rule and the transition probabilities of the Markov chain can use Bayes's theorem to compute the optimal strategy (following Littman, 2009) . These agents use all their available information to form beliefs regarding the chances that nature is in each of the states in the current trial. Their decision is then a weighted average of the optimal decisions in each state.
Agents who do not know the task's parameters and payoff rule-as is the case in most natural decision tasks and in most decisions from experience research-can rely only on their past experience. Because the same process generates all outcomes, these agents should optimally assign some weight to each of their past experiences and decide accordingly. However, the computation of the optimal weights to use can be very difficult and is thus highly improbable. In this section, we analyze the performance of the most naïve weighting rule, assigning the same weight to each past outcome, and the performance of two classes of more sophisticated one-parameter generalizations of this rule. The first class of generalizations is the popular discounted average rule, which implies decreasing weight with time (possibly because of decaying memory). The second class is a classification of experiences to either relevant (weight of one) or irrelevant (weight of zero), based on the current contingency. Information in these settings is scarce and limited to the past outcomes. Thus, the current contingency is determined using sequences of past outcomes (see related ideas in Restle, 1961; Spiliopoulos, 2012) . Although this dichotomy between relevant and irrelevant experiences implies behavior that reflects reliance on small samples in many cases, we show that it not only outperforms the other rules, but also approximates the optimal behavior in this wide class of choice tasks.
The Weighting Rules
In each trial of the problem, the best the uninformed agent can do is to assign some weight to each of her past experiences, compute the weighted average of the payoff from each option, and choose the option with the higher weighted average. The simplest and most naïve way to assign weights is to give each past outcome the same weight. This weighting rule is known as the fictitious play strategy (Brown, 1951) . It implies choice of the option that led to the best outcome in the past, thus we expect it to perform well when the environment is static, but not so well when the payoffs probabilities can change from trial to trial.
A natural way to account for a changing environment is to give more weight to recent outcomes than to earlier outcomes. To do so, we take Q t j , the weighted-average payoff of option j in time t, to be
where V t j is the observed outcome from option j in time t, and ␣ʦ͓0,1͔ is a free parameter (Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2006) . 3 When ␣ ϭ 1 this weighted average is the simple average of all outcomes, hence this rule coincides with the fictitious play strategy (i.e., the addition of the free parameter 2 This space of decision tasks is in fact a space of partially observable Markov decision processes (or POMDP). See Busemeyer and Pleskac (2009) and Littman (2009) for discussions on these settings. 3 In addition, we assume Q 0 j ϭ 0 for both j, and a random first choice. Hertwig et al. (2006) used this model, which they called the value-updating model, with an added assumption that the experienced outcomes are transformed using prospect theory's value function. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
generalizes fictitious play). 4 These discounted average rules are highly effective when the probability of staying in each state in the Markov chain (or in similar states) is larger than the probability of a switch (as in Chain Repetition in Figure 3 ), but they are less effective when probabilities of outcomes can change in other ways. For example, these rules fail to maximize payoff in settings in which the action option provides a gain in all odd trials and a loss in all even trials, because they cannot detect the simple alternation pattern.
We consider another one-parameter generalization of fictitious play that does allow for the detection of patterns of outcomes. In this class of weighting rules, like in fictitious play, the weight of each experience the agent takes into account is equal. Unlike in fictitious play however, the agent does not take into account all past experiences, but only experiences relevant to the current contingency. Strategy CAB-k is a contingent average rule that is based on the last k outcomes: CAB-k considers an experience as relevant if that experience followed a sequence of k outcomes that is identical to the most recent sequence of k outcomes.
5 Consider, for example, Rule CAB-2 and assume that in the first six trials, the action option generated the outcome sequence GGLLGG (loss in Trial 3 and Trial 4, gain in the other four trials). Rule CAB-2 implies that at Trial 7 the agent considers only trials that followed the sequence GG as relevant (only Trial 3 in the current example) and selects the action option if the average payoff from action in these trials is larger than zero (which is the payoff of the other, status quo, option). Because the outcome at Trial 3 was a loss, CAB-2 rule prescribes a status quo choice at Trial 7.
6 These rules will have no problem detecting simple patterns in the outcomes: In the alternation example (i.e., GLGLGL . . .), CAB-1 rule will have considered only odd trials as relevant before an odd trial and only even trials as relevant before an even trial, thus it will always prescribe the optimal option. However, when the number of experiences considered relevant by these rules is small, their use reflects behavior that appears as reliance on small samples. 4 More common versions of such models are decay reinforcement models (Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005) , in which the weight given to the last outcome is stationary in time. We examined such models with a single parameter (i.e., we replaced 1 ր t ␣ with ␣). Main qualitative results reported in this paper remain unchanged. Note, however, that such rules are not a one-parameter generalization of fictitious play.
5 This is a generalization of fictitious play because k ϭ 0 implies that all past experiences are equally relevant; hence CAB-0 coincides with fictitious play. 6 In addition we assume that before having past experiences similar to the current sequence of size k, the agents that follow a CAB-k strategy focus on the longest sequence for which they do have experience (i.e., they try using k -1, k -2 etc.). Consequently, at the second trial all agents use CAB-0. The very first choice is random. Figure 4 . A space of binary decision tasks. A decision maker faces a decision between two options, status quo and action (top). The payoff from action depends on the state of nature, which is determined by a four-state Markov chain (bottom), described in two ways, graphically and with a matrix. p i,j is the probability of transition of nature from state i to state j. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Computational Analysis
We randomly generated 10,000 problems from the space described in Figure 4 with the following constraints. First, the transition probabilities in each row include one unique value, uniformly drawn from (0.25, 1), which location in the row was randomly determined. The other three probabilities in each row are equal.
7 Second, the value of V Gain was uniformly drawn from [1, 20] and the value of V Loss was uniformly drawn from [Ϫ20, Ϫ1].
Then, we ran simulations in which 14 virtual agents faced each of the 10,000 problems for 50,000 trials. One of the 14 agents, referred to as Fully Informed Bayesian Agent (FIBA), was assumed to know the exact transition matrix and was programmed to use Bayes's theorem to maximize expected return. We use it as an upper bound of the performance of the uninformed optimal agent. The other agents followed strategies that do not use prior information concerning the transition matrix or the payoff rule. Each of these agents weighted each of the past experiences according to one of the weighting rules described previously: One agent followed the fictitious play (FP) strategy; seven agents followed the discounted average rules with the parameter ␣ equals 0, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, or 0.9.; and six agents followed CAB-k rules, with k ϭ 1, 2 . . ., 6.
The left section of Table 1 shows that when the number of repeated trials is large (50,000), Rule CAB-3 implies the same choice as the fully informed Bayesian agent in 98.9% of the trials. Other CAB-k rules are only slightly less optimal, and all these rules cogently outperform the discounted average rules and fictitious play.
CAB-k Rules and Reliance on Small Samples
The computation required to use a specific CAB-k rule includes two stages. First, agents consider all their past experiences to detect those that are similar to the current choice task. Second, agents focus on the set of similar past experiences and use it to choose an alternative. In the current setting (when only two outcomes are possible), strategy CAB-k first classifies the past experiences into 2 k categories (the number of possible sequences of length k). Experiences in only one of these categories are considered similar to the current trial. Then, in the second stage, the decision is made based only on these experiences.
8 Naturally, the larger the k, the more categories there are, and the less experiences belong to each category. In particular, when the total number of experiences classified (i.e., the total number of trials so far, t) is small relative to the number of categories (2 k in the current example), the size of the sample used in the second stage can be very small. For example, if a gain and a loss occur with the same probability (thus the expected number of experiences classified to each category is the same), then at Trial 51, after experiencing t ϭ 50 outcomes, the expected number of experiences CAB-5 rule uses in the second stage is only 50/2 5 ϭ 1.56. 9 In other words, although the use of CAB-k rules implies sensitivity to all past experiences (in the first stage), it can lead to choice behavior that reflects reliance on small samples (in the second, and choice, stage).
Three analyses were performed to clarify the effect of reliance on small samples (at the choice stage) by CAB-k rules. The first repeats the analysis presented previously, but with a much smaller number of total past experiences (i.e., with fewer experiences to initially classify and consequently, fewer experiences to finally consider). The right-hand section in Table 1 exhibits CAB-k performance only for the first 100 trials in each problem. The results reveal that the effectiveness of CAB-k rules diminishes, and especially so for large k (recall that the larger the k, the smaller the number of experiences considered).
10 However, for a small enough k, CAB-k rules still do better than the discounted average rules and fictitious play.
The second analysis is motivated by the hypothesis that reliance on small samples is especially counterproductive when the environment is static, or close to static: When the probabilities to gain and loss remain rather constant, nearly all experiences should be accounted for (they are all relevant), and using only a few of them could lead to poor decisions. To evaluate this hypothesis, we grouped the results summarized in Table 1 by the problems' variability of probabilities of the outcomes. We define the variability of probabilities of a problem as the standard deviation (SD) Note. The six discounted average rules give more weight to recent outcomes (␣ ϭ 0 is best reply to the last outcome and ␣ ϭ 1 implies fictitious play). The six contingent average (CAB-k) rules imply best reply to past experiences that follow identical k recent outcomes. Performance was computed for a 50,000-trial experiment and for the first 100 trials of each experiment. FIBA ϭ fully informed Bayesian agent; FP ϭ fictitious play strategy. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
of the objective probability for a gain in the steady state. 11 Notice that static problems (i.e., problems with the same probability for a gain in all trials) have a minimal variability level of zero, while the maximal level of variability is 0.5 (this happens, e.g., if the probability for a gain alternates between zero and one). The results of this grouping are presented in Figure 5 . The left hand side presents the performance of the different weighting rules over 50,000 trials; the right-hand side shows the same statistics for the first 100 trials. The results reveal that FP rule outperforms the CAB-k rules in one case: when the environment is nearly static (variability Ͻ0.1) and the number of trials is small. In all other cases, the CAB-k rules outperform FP and all the discounted average rules.
Particularly clear failures of CAB-k rules occur in a subset of the "static problem, small t" category in which the environment contains consequential rare events, that is, when reliance on small samples is especially counterproductive. Remarkably, this small subset was the main focus of decisions from experience research thus far. For example, in the (static) problem from Nevo and Erev (2012) discussed in Figure 1 , the Ϫ10 loss is a rare event that a decision maker must take into account, as it has detrimental effect on the expected value of the gamble compared with the status quo. Table 2 shows that CAB-k rules lead to large deviations from maximization in this problem. Maximization implies no action choices; however, these rules prescribe action choice in nearly 50% or more of the trials. The virtual agents' behavior reflects the underweighting of rare events pattern documented in human behavior. That is, they behave as if they believe that the probability of the loss is lower than .1. Moreover, the larger the k, the more the CAB-k strategies deviate from maximization, which implies this is due to reliance on small samples.
As discussed in preceding text, reliance on small samples leads not only to underweighting of rare events, but also to a bias toward probability matching. To examine this prediction, we checked the correlation between the proportion of action choices implied by CAB-k in the 10,000 simulated problems and the steady-state probability for a gain in each of these problems. Table 3 shows that for a small number of trials (100) and for large enough k (i.e., when CAB-k relies on small samples of experiences), the correlation is more than .8, which implies a strong bias toward probability matching. When CAB-k relies on larger samples, the correlation drops.
The N-State Case
In the preceding analyses, we investigated a space of problems in which the state of nature is determined by a four-state Markov chain. This is the simplest generalization of the previously researched binary decision from experience problems in which the agent cannot tell the state by the outcomes with certainty. We now remove the four-state constraint and allow for many more states. In particular, we ran simulations with 10 states and with 40 states in each problem, where half the states imply the same gain and half imply the same loss from the action option. We used the same problem-generating process as we did in the four-state case. To allow the probability of the more frequent event to remain a member of (0.5, 1), we took the lower bound of the unique value probability to be 1/N (with N equals 10 or 40).
When the number of states is large, there is a very small chance that a randomly selected problem will create steady patterns of outcomes; therefore, we expect the effectiveness of CAB-k rules, which work especially well when patterns of outcomes exist, to decline. Table 4 shows that this is indeed the case, yet the decline is small: even in the 40-states case, CAB-4 rule is optimal in more than 95% of the trials, and all CAB-k rules prescribe the optimal choice more often than the other weighting rules.
Extending the analysis to an unbounded number of states is computationally challenging, but we can approximate it by analyzing the weighting rules' performance in a similar space of problems. At each trial of each problem, the probability for a positive action payoff, pGain, either remains the same as in the previous trial (which happens with probability pSame), or changes to a value randomly drawn from a fixed beta distribution (with probability 1 -pSame). Thus, in addition to the possible action payoffs, three parameters define each problem in the space: the two beta distribution's parameters and pSame. Note that within each problem, pGain can get any (unbounded) number of values and that this process can be described using a Markov chain with an infinite number of states. Yu and Cohen (2009) show that beliefs consistent with this type of outcome-generating process can explain human participants' behavior in a visual perception task. They further show that a variant of the discounted average rules (in particular, exponential discounting of recent observations) actually approximates the Bayes-optimal behavior in this class of problems.
12 Hence, comparing CAB-k to the discounted average rules in this space presents a particularly difficult challenge for CAB-k rules.
We tested the weighting rules' performance in 10,000 problems drawn from this space, with pSame randomly drawn from (0, 1) and the two beta distribution's parameters each randomly drawn from (0, 2). These parameters imply that the mean absolute change in pGain between any two consecutive trials of a problem is 0.135. Table 5 shows that even in this challenging space, in the long term, CAB-k rules achieve higher average payoff than the discounted average rules, and in the short term, they achieve similar average payoffs, for a small enough k.
Gradually Changing Environments
One critique of the analysis thus far is that our definition for changing environments (that the probabilities of different outcomes depend of the state of nature, which changes according to a Markov chain) involves a built-in disadvantage for discounted average rules: probabilities of outcomes change in a discrete, potentially very abrupt, manner. Consequently, the autocorrelation between outcomes is not always positive, and even when positive, it is not sufficiently high. Although it is true that these type of environmental changes can have detrimental effects on the performance of discounted average rules (e.g., when the chain generates 11 That is, the standard deviation of the gain probability over many trials. 12 In fact, Yu and Cohen (2009) use a variant of a decay reinforcement learning model, not of a discounted average model (see Footnote 4), but we verified that the results of the two models are similar in this space as well. In addition, as they investigated behavior in a visual perception task, their analysis was limited to the case of symmetric payoffs (i.e., fixed payoff for correct identification of the stimulus, regardless of its type). In this specific case, the advantage of CAB-k over discounted average rules is diminished. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
perfect alternation between gains and losses), note that problems in which probabilities of outcomes change gradually can also be described using a Markov chain with sufficiently many states. Hence, the space from Table 5 (approximating the case of unbounded number of states) generalizes a space of gradually changing settings. Moreover, we analyzed the performance of the different weighting rules in a space of gradually changing settings that extends the space from Table 5 . In this space, the outcome probabilities are determined by an autoregressive process of the type in which discounted average rules are expected to succeed. Specifically, in every problem, pGain at trial t is a weighted average of pGain at trial t -1 and of another value. This value either is drawn from a fixed beta distribution (with probability 1 -pSame) or is the same as in the previous trial.
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The rate of environmental change in this space (determined by each problem's parameters) varies significantly (see Figure 6 for examples), and the weighting rules' performance depends heavily on this rate. To show this, we ranked the randomly drawn problems according to their rate of change, grouped them to 10 equalsize classes (deciles), and computed the weighting rules' performance for each class. Figure 6 shows that in the short term, the discounted average rules achieve better performance in every class. However, in the long term, in all but the least volatile of settings, CAB-k outperform discounted average rules. One possible reason behind this success is the fact that in the long term, and especially when changes are frequent, CAB-k are likely to consider relevant many trials in which the process was in a state similar to the current trial (i.e., trials in which pGain was close to its current true value); in contrast, decaying memory implies that discounted average rules cannot recall many of these early trials. The results further imply that, in the long term, while a fixed k (e.g., k ϭ 5) obtains very good (relative) performance across the space, a fixed ␣ does not. For example, using a relatively small ␣ (i.e., short memory) is very helpful in the first decile (when the setting is relatively stable), but not in the tenth decile (when changes are large and frequent).
Contingent Average Rules and Human Behavior
The previous section demonstrates the effectiveness and relative robustness of using contingent average rules over large classes of problems, particularly in the long term and when the incentive structure reflects a hidden Markov chain. Moreover, these classes include problems that have been extensively studied in the past, such as decisions made in static settings or in gradually changing 13 Hence, when the weight given to pGain at trial t -1 is 0, the problem is part of the space from Table 5 . Appendix A includes more details on this space. . Proportion of optimal choices for selected weighting rules, as a function of the level of variability of a problem. Results are averaged across 10,000 randomly generated problems that were each run for 50,000 trials (upper left) or 100 trials (upper right). The level of variability is measured by the standard deviation (SD) of the steady-state probability for a gain, as shown in the bottom left table, which also presents the number of problems that fall in each category (n). FP is the fictitious play rule, CAB-k are contingent average rules based on the last k outcomes, and ␣ ϭ a are discounted average rules that give more weight to recent outcomes. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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settings. Hence, contingent average rules appear to work well across multiple underlying structures of the environments, and when the exact structure of the environment is unknown, the use of contingent average rules may be ecologically clever. 14 In addition, the simulations show that the use of contingent average rules constitutes a sufficient condition to the tendency to rely on small samples (and its implied behavioral phenomena). The use of contingent average rules implies a very different cognitive process than the processes suggested by the known contributors to this tendency. The known contributors (e.g., high cognitive costs and environmental positive autocorrelation) suggest learning processes that use limited memory and reflect positive recency. In contrast, contingent average rules, which reflect sensitivity to sequential patterns, require a large memory base and allows for the possibility of negative recency effects (a point that will be clarified subsequently).
In the current section, we examine the significance of the psychological processes suggested in the previous section. We begin with a review of previous research consistent with the contingent average hypothesis. This short review demonstrates that the demanding computations required by contingent average rules are cognitively feasible. Next, we analyze published data to evaluate the relative importance of processes that imply high sensitivity to contingent averages in comparison with processes that imply positive recency effects.
Previous Research and Cognitive Feasibility
The simulation studies show that contingent average rules can be more effective than discounted average rules, but also show that discounted average rules require less cognitive resources. Specifically, the use of a discounted average rule requires the storage of only two numbers (the discounted average, Q t j , and the trial number); in contrast, the use of a contingent average rule requires the storage of one number (the sum of payoffs) per contingency. For 14 Of course, we cannot make claims regarding the ecological validity of the specific rules we consider in problems that go beyond the set of problems we consider, such as problems with partial feedback or problems in which current decisions affect future outcomes. The section Limitations of CAT ahead provides some insights on ways to extend these rules to be tested on other types of settings. Note. Performance in the problem "0 with certainty or Ϫ10 with probability .1, ϩ1 otherwise". The six discounted average strategies give more weight to recent outcomes (␣ ϭ 0 is best reply to the last outcome and ␣ ϭ 1 implies fictitious play). The six CAB-k rules imply best reply to past experiences that follow identical k recent outcomes. FIBA ϭ fully informed Bayesian agent; FP ϭ fictitious play strategy. Note. The six discounted average strategies give more weight to recent outcomes (␣ ϭ 0 is best reply to the last outcome and ␣ ϭ 1 implies fictitious play). The six CAB-k rules imply best reply to past experiences that follow identical k recent outcomes. FIBA ϭ fully informed Bayesian agent; FP ϭ fictitious play strategy. Note. The six discounted average strategies give more weight to recent outcomes (␣ ϭ 0 is best reply to the last outcome and ␣ ϭ 1 implies fictitious play). The six CAB-k rules imply best reply to past experiences that follow identical k recent outcomes. FIBA ϭ fully informed Bayesian agent; FP ϭ fictitious play strategy.
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example, a CAB-6 rule requires the storage of 2 6 ϭ 64 numbers per option (plus the exact sequence each of these numbers correspond to). Thus, contingent average rules may be too demanding to be psychologically significant. Alternatively, the many computations and large storage capacity required by contingent average rules may not necessarily eliminate their explanatory power, for instance, if the processes they imply are automatic and intuitive (Betsch, 2008; Betsch & Glöckner, 2010) . Indeed, past studies suggest that although cognitively demanding, CAB-k rules can have high descriptive value.
One indication for the use of CAB-k (or similar) rules comes from studies that demonstrate that people, and other animals, can be highly sensitive to sequential patterns. Rats can learn to alternate between two options in a T maze (Restle, 1961) -that is, they can learn to behave according to CAB-1 rule-whereas humans can easily and quickly discover much more complex sequences. For example, Galanter and Smith (1958) have reported that participants discovered a sequence of length five after only a few repetitions of the sequence, although they were not explicitly told that a pattern exists. In their study, the sequence of events was fixed and deterministic (i.e., given the five most recent outcomes, one could know with certainty the next outcome), but people can also learn sequential patterns when they are noisy, albeit slightly slower (e.g., Bruner, Wallach, & Galanter, 1959) . This high sensitivity to sequential patterns was found in a wide variety of different tasks including perceptual-motor tasks (specifically the serial reaction time (RT) task, Nissen & Bullemer, 1987 ; for reviews see Abrahamse, Jiménez, Verwey, & Clegg, 2010; Clegg, Digirolamo, & Keele, 1998; Keele, Ivry, Mayr, Hazeltine, & Heuer, 2003) , probability learning tasks (Gaissmaier & Schooler, 2008; Lee, 1971; Restle, 1967; Restle & Brown, 1970) and strategic two-person games (Spiliopoulos, 2012 (Spiliopoulos, , 2013 in which people respond to, and exploit, sequential patterns of actions from their human opponent. 15, 16 Some studies have also shown that people are able to condition their behavior on sequences at least as long as six or seven recent outcomes (Lewicki, Czyzewska, & Hoffman, 1987; Millward & Reber, 1972; Remillard, 2010) , requiring the storage of many possible contingencies. In other words, although cognitively demanding, people are capable of using rules at least as complex as CAB-6. 17 CAB-k rules not only imply the observed sensitivity to genuine sequential patterns, but also imply susceptibility to spurious patterns that occur randomly (when in practice outcomes are independent). Research suggests that people indeed tend to search for a pattern even when none is available (Gaissmaier & Schooler, 2008; Restle, 1961; Yu & Cohen, 2009) , and some are even willing to offer hypotheses about existing patterns they have "found" (Jarvik, 1951; Lee, 1971) . In one elegant study, Gaissmaier and Schooler (2008) compared probability learning behavior in static and dynamic settings. In each trial of their study, the participants faced a task similar to that of Figure 2 . In the static settings, the probability of the more common color was fixed at 2/3. In the dynamic settings, the probability of the more common color changed from trial to trial in a systematic fashion: it was 1 in 2/3 of trials, and 0 in the other 1/3, and the order of the 0s and 1s was determined in advance. The colors followed a pattern of length 12:
The correct answer at trial (t ϩ 12) was the same as the correct answer at trial t. In other words, this setting can be described by a Markov chain similar to Chain Cycle from Figure 3 (without the corresponding 'day of the week' signal). Each participant performed both tasks. Notice that the optimal behavior in the static setting requires the use of the Fictitious Play (or CAB-0) rule, which leads to poor performance in the dynamic setting. The optimal strategy in the dynamic setting requires the use of a CAB-12 (or a more complex) rule, which leads to poor performance in the static setting. 18 The results reveal negative correlation between the performances in the two settings: subjects that performed better in the dynamic setting, performed worse in the static setting. These results first demonstrate that at least some participants behave as if they search for a pattern when none is available and second suggest that there are individual differences in the tendency to use specific contingent average rules.
Another indication for the descriptive value of CAB-k rules comes from a recent study of the partial reinforcement extinction effect (Humphreys, 1939) : the observation that under partial reinforcement schedule (high-payoff variability) learning is slower but 15 People are usually inefficient at attempts to randomize their actions, tending to produce somewhat predictable sequences of actions (Rapoport & Budescu, 1997 ) that can be exploited by their opponent and prove detrimental. 16 We have also run pilot experiments and found people easily capture (noisy) sequential patterns in the clicking paradigm (demonstrated in Figure 1 ). 17 The number of possible events in many such studies was larger than two, hence, the number of possible contingencies participants had to use given their sensitivity to six recent outcomes is even greater than the number of contingencies required by CAB-6. In Lewicki et al.'s (1987) study, for example, there were 384 possible sequences of events predicting the four possible outcomes, six times more than required by CAB-6 in our settings. 18 In fact, we have simulated CAB-12 rule's predictions in Gaissmaier and Schooler's (2008) experimental design and found that by their classification, CAB-12 users maximize payoff in the dynamic setting, and deviate from maximization by exhibiting probability matching (select the common square in about 2/3 of the trials) in the static setting. Note. The six discounted average strategies give more weight to recent outcomes (␣ ϭ 0 is best reply to the last outcome and ␣ ϭ 1 implies fictitious play). The six CAB-k rules imply best reply to past experiences that follow identical k recent outcomes. FP ϭ fictitious play strategy.
more robust to extinction than under full reinforcement schedule. Hochman and Erev (2013) replicated this effect using the paradigm in Figure 1 , and showed that the results are better predicted with a CAB-4 rule than with the common explanations.
Sensitivity to Contingent Averages and the Wavy Recency Effect
Although research have suggested that people can-and many times do-behave as if they use contingent average rules, the popular models of basic learning processes (e.g., Bush & Mosteller, 1955; Denrell, 2005; Erev & Roth, 1998; Fudenberg & Levine, 1998; March, 1996; Sutton & Barto, 1998; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005) tend to ignore the agents' sensitivity to patterns, and focus on variants of the discounted average rules discussed in preceding text. This tendency can be the product of two claims. The first involves the intuition that the potential benefits (in term of expected return) from high sensitivity to contingent averages are small compared with their cognitive costs, and the implication that people would thus tend to use discounted average or similar rules. This intuition may emerge from the reasonable convention to start the development of learning models with the analysis of simple static settings, in which sensitivity to patterns leads to poor decisions. The second claim is that indications of reactions to patterns reflect situation specific habits (Estes, 1964) . Both claims lead to the implicit assumption that the effort to capture the distinct sensitivities to patterns will result in models too complex to be useful. We believe that our computational results support a more optimistic hypothesis: The observation that CAB-k rules can be effective in a wide set of environments implies that it may be possible to develop tractable and general models that capture not only the basic properties of aggregated choice rates, but also the robust sequential patterns. Moreover, if the underlying cognitive processes reflect high sensitivity to contingent averages, models that ignore these features of the processes, such as discounted average rules, are likely to lead to incorrect predictions.
To clarify the psychological significance of contingent averages, we chose to focus on the impact of recent outcomes. As noted, the known contributors to the tendency to rely on small samples, and the leading learning models, imply a positive recency effect. That is, the impact of each outcome is expected to be maximal immediately after its occurrence, and to diminish monotonically with time. For example, in Problem 2 from Table 6 ( This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
bility .1, Ϫ1 otherwise; or 0), a rare positive outcome (ϩ10) at trial t is expected to have a strong positive effect on the tendency to select the risky action in the next trial. This effect should then diminish with time. The assumption that people are sensitive to contingent averages allows for very different predictions. Specifically, when the payoff includes rare outcomes, CAB-k rules predict a nonmonotonic development over time with three distinct stages: The initial effect is negative, the effect becomes positive after exactly k trials, and finally, in the long term, the effect diminishes. For example, in Problem 2, a CAB-5 rule predicts that following a rare ϩ10 payoff at trial t, the probability of choosing the risky action (relative to the mean) will: (a) decrease in the next 5 trials, (b) significantly increase at trial (t ϩ 6), and (c) slowly decrease with time after trial (t ϩ 6). The predicted nonmonotonic pattern under CAB-k rules reflects the fact that the outcome at trial t has two distinct effects. First, it is part of the sequence determining the contingency in the next k trials. In other words, the outcome at trial t influences the set of past experiences that seem similar to the problems in trials (t ϩ 1) through (t ϩ k). When the outcome at trial t is a rare payoff-and the sequence that determines the contingency is relatively rarethe number of past experiences that seem similar to the next k trials decreases. Hence, in the first k trials after a rare outcome, CAB-k rely on relatively small samples of experiences. Small samples, in turn, lead to underweighting of rare events, and thus following a rare outcome at trial t, rare outcomes are less likely to be considered, which implies a negative recency effect of rare events. The second effect of the outcome at trial t occurs when this trial is among the trials that seem similar to the current trial (i.e., is part of the sample a CAB-k rule relies on). This effect is positive: It implies that the payoff at trial t directly affects the attractiveness of action. Although the first (negative) effect lasts only in the first k trials after a rare event, the second (positive) effect is long term (although it slowly diminishes in time). Hence, exactly k ϩ 1 trials after the rare event, its cumulative impact on choice becomes positive and then slowly diminishes.
For example, consider the decision at Trial 51 of a participant who uses a CAB-5 rule while facing Problem 2 (ϩ10, .1; Ϫ1). After the common sequence LLLLL, which precedes 59% of the trials, the participant is expected to consider (0.59) · 50 ϭ 29.5 past experiences; after the less common sequence LLLLG, which precedes less than 7% of the trials (as do the sequences LLLGL, LLGLL, LGLLL, GLLLL), the participant is expected to consider only (0.07) · 50 ϭ 3.5 past experiences.
19 Because smaller samples lead to more underweighting of rare events, the participant is less likely to consider relevant a ϩ10 outcome in the first five trials after observing one.
To compare the contradicting predictions of the two classes of models, we rely on data of published studies that examined the effect of rare events on the aggregated choice rates. Specifically, we focus on two studies (Nevo & Erev, 2012; and Teodorescu, Amir, & Erev, 2013 ) that used the clicking paradigm (see Figure  1 ) to study Problem 1 and Problem 2 shown in Table 6 . Each of these problems was repeatedly faced for 100 trials by each of the 128 participants. Participants got full feedback (for both options) after each trial and were paid (in Shekels) for one randomly selected trial. Aggregate choice rates of both problems appear to reflect underweighting of the rare event. In Problem 1, participants chose the negative expected value gamble in more than 50% of the trials, and in Problem 2, participants chose the positive expected value gamble in less than 50% of the trials.
At the first stage of our analysis, we fitted three one-parameter models to the aggregated observed choice rates (see Table 6 ). The first two models are the contingent average rule and the discounted average rule discussed previously. The third model, referred to as sample of m, assumes random choice in the first trial and then best reply to a random sample (with replacement) of m past experiences with each alternative. The estimated (fixed) parameters are k ϭ 7 for the contingent average model, ␣ ϭ .30 for the discounted average model, and m ϭ 12 for the sample of m model. 20 The results show that all three models fit the aggregate choice rates rather well (and predict an underweighting of rare events pattern).
At the second stage of the analysis, we compared the models' predictions (with the parameters estimated in preceding text) of the action choice rates contingent on sequences of recent outcomes. The light curves in the top ("Fixed Parameter") section of Figure  7 present the predictions of the three models following the most common sequences of 10 trials in each problem, as a function of the number of trials since the last appearance of the rare event. For example, the "choice rate three trials since the rare event" means 19 In fact, even slightly less-see Footnote 9. 20 The estimation used a grid search procedure to find the lowest mean squared deviation achieved for k ʦ ͕1, . . . , 20͖, m ʦ ͕1, . . . , 20͖, and ␣ ʦ ͓0, 1͔ with a .01 discretization. Note. Action-option is the alternative to the status quo (payoff of zero). Choice rates are for 100 trials with full feedback from both options. The models' parameters (in parenthesis) were estimated to fit the observed choice rates. a Each outcome is followed by its probability. b Aggregate choice rates of 48 participants from Nevo & Erev (2012) and 80 participants from Teodorescu et al. (2013) .
c The individual differences variants of the models assume that the models' parameters are distributed uniformly across participants and the estimated parameters determine the support of the uniform distribution. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
the choice rate following the sequences GGGGGGGLGG in Problem 1 and LLLLLLLGLL in Problem 2. The prediction curves show large differences between the three models. The contingent average model predicts an initial negative recency effect: less sensitivity to the rare events soon after their occurrence than several trials after their occurrence. For example, in Problem 1, in the first five trials after the large and rare loss, the predicted action rate is 78% on average, but the impact of the loss increases over time: The action rate decreases to 49% on average six to 10 trials after the loss. The discounted average model predicts the opposite pattern, a positive recency effect (i.e., more sensitivity to the rare event soon after its occurrence), and the sample of m model predicts only slight positive recency effect.
The dark wavy curves in Figure 7 present the observed average choice rates from the experimental studies following the different contingencies. Consistent with the contingent average model, they reflect a nonmonotonic impact of rare events. Yet, the experimental curves are even more nonmonotonic than predicted. They imply an initial short-term period of positive recency, followed by a longer period of negative recency starting three trials after the rare event, and finally an increase in the tendency to respond to the rare event. That is, they imply a wavy recency effect of the rare event.
Although the contingent average model does not predict the initial brief period of positive recency observed, it clearly captures the rest of the qualitative pattern in the human data better than the other models. In particular, the data is consistent with the model's negative recency prediction. In Problem 1, for example, the average choice rate soon (one to five trials) after the rare loss is 65%, but later (six to 10 trials after the loss) it is only 50%. We return Table 6 . Each sequence of 10 outcomes contains either exactly one rare event (1-10 trials since rare event), or no rare events (11ϩ trials since rare event). The observed choice rates are based on 3.5 observations per subject on average (about 448 observations in each problem per sequence) following sequences that contain exactly one rare event, or on 31.3 observations per subject (about 4,012 observations in each problem) following the sequences with no rare events. Data points are given with 95% CI for the mean. The top section shows predictions for the fixed parameter version of three one-parameter models: contingent average rule with k ϭ 7, discounted average rule with ␣ ϭ .30, and the sample of 12 model. The bottom section shows the predictions of the three models when each model's parameter is distributed uniformly between 1 and 14 for the contingent average model, between 1 and 9 for the sample of m model, and between 0 and .66 for the discounted average model. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
to the model's qualitative miss in the first couple of trials later in this study. Another limitation of the contingent average model is suggested by its not impressive quantitative fit. Indeed, the sample of m model provides a better fit. The mean-squared distances (MSD) across the 22 contingent choice rates from Figure 7 are 0.0238 and 0.0156 for the contingent average and the sample of m model respectively (The discounted average model has a much higher MSD score of 0.2770.) The curves shown in the top section of Figure 7 reveal a likely cause for the quantitative failure of the CAB-7 rule: it predicts a drastic change in the aggregate choice rates exactly eight trials after the rare event (when the most recent sequence of k ϭ 7 outcomes no longer includes the rare event). The experimental results however, show a more gradual change in choice rates. This observation implies that the focus on a single sequence length (in this case, seven) is too restrictive. It is possible that different individuals rely on different lengths of sequences (an assertion supported also by the preceding analysis, see Gaissmaier & Schooler, 2008) .
Motivated by this observation and by previous research that shows that assuming some distribution over the value of a model's parameter can improve its fit (e.g., Erev & Roth, 2014) , we investigated, for each of the three models, a variant of the model that allows for individual differences in the value of its parameter. The modified contingent average model, CAB-k i , assumes that each individual's sequence-length k i is drawn uniformly from the set 1 . . ., K. Similarly, the sample of m i model assumes that each individual's sample size m i is drawn uniformly from the set 1 . . ., M. The modified discounted average model assumes that the individual's recency parameter ␣ i is drawn uniformly from the set [0, 2〈] if 〈 Յ 0.5 and from the set [2〈 -1, 1] if 〈 Ͼ 0.5.
21 Note that each model still only has one free parameter: the maximal possible value of the individual's parameter in the contingent average and sample of m models and the expectation of each individual's parameter in the discounted average model.
We fitted the three models to the (aggregated) action choice rates in the two problems (i.e., we used the same estimation method as in the previous analysis). The values obtained are K ϭ 14 for the CAB-k i model, M ϭ 9 for the sample of m i model and 〈 ϭ 0.32 for the modified discounted average model. The right most section of Table 6 shows that all three models capture the underweighting of rare events phenomenon in both problems, but the bottom section of Figure 7 shows that only the contingent average model captures the qualitative trends. Furthermore, the fit of the contingent average model improved significantly: its MSD is 0.0128. The MSD scores of the sample of m i and the modified discounted average model are 0.0155 and 0.1808, respectively. In other words, all three models imply reliance on small samples and all predict underweighting of rare events well, but both qualitatively and quantitatively, the contingent average model predicts the observed impact of rare events better.
22

Preferences, Beliefs, and Adaptation to Changing Settings
The computational analysis provides one possible explanation for the nonmonotonic recency effect and in particular for the negative recency impact of rare events. The use of CAB-k rules is very useful in binary-outcome settings in which outcome probabilities can change in time. Therefore, if participants believe that the environment is not necessarily static, they would be wise to use these rules. That is, participants' behavior in the nonrealistic static settings may reflect overgeneralization from the probably more ecological changing settings. An alternative explanation for the negative recency phenomenon is that it represents incidental preferences. It could be that the relatively large outcomes of the rare events affect behavior because the experienced payoffs cross some aspiration level. For example, in the first few trials after obtaining a large (rare) gain in Problem 2, the pleased participant may be content with maintaining the status quo of her payoffs. Hence, her choice rate of the action option decreases relative to the choice rate following several small losses (which she might try to make up for by selecting the gamble more).
To examine whether the observed behavior is the result of participants' preferences or their beliefs that the setting may change in time, we looked into data collected by Barron and Yechiam (2009) . In their research, they used the clicking paradigm from Figure 1 to study participants' experience-based decisions in four problems presented in Table 7 . Problem 3 and Problem 4 were published in Barron and Yechiam (2009) . Problem 5 and Problem 6 were run as part of a pilot study and were not used in the final version of that paper. Yet, their results are similar to those of the other two problems.
23 Each participant faced one problem for 400 trials and was awarded for one randomly selected trial. In each problem, the expected payoffs were the same for both options, but the risky option included a bad rare event, which granted a lower payoff than the payoff granted by the safe (status-quo) option. Of special interest to us is that in addition to the choice task, in Trials 201-400 of each problem, Barron and Yechiam asked the participants to estimate the probability that the bad (rare) event will appear in the next trial (and the estimation was followed by an actual choice). This estimation task allows some insight to participants' beliefs regarding the outcome probabilities. If the negative impact of rare events in the choice task is the result of participants' changing preferences then there need not be a change in their estimations from trial to trial. On the other hand, if the impact is the result of participants' beliefs that the probabilities change in time, then we expect estimations to be lower in the first trials after the rare event than several trials later.
Analysis of the data from the two studies shows that even after long experience (at least 200 trials) with the task, participants did not learn to estimate the (constant) probability of the low outcome as the same in all trials. For example, the average number of different estimates per participant was 15.7 and the median number was 12. Almost all participants (96%) had at least five different estimates. Furthermore, the estimates varied significantly: The minimal estimation for each of the 80 participants was zero, but their average maximal estimation was .79 and 85% of the participants had a maximal estimate of at least .5 for the rare (probability 21 That is, the parameter of the modified discounted average model, 〈, is the mean value of the uniform distribution the individual recency parameters ␣ i take, while maintaining the restriction that 0 Յ ␣ i Յ 1. 22 It is clear, however, that this model can be improved. For example, Adding parameters that capture risk aversion can only improve the fit to the current data. 23 We are grateful to Greg Barron and Eldad Yechiam for letting us analyze both their published and unpublished data. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
.15) low outcome. These results suggest that participants indeed assumed they were facing a dynamic setting.
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More interesting though, is the pattern of change of the estimates. The light curve in Figure 8 shows the average estimates following the most common sequences of 10 outcomes from the risky option (a similar analysis to that made in the previous section). As Barron and Yechiam (2009) suggested, there is a negative recency effect for the rare outcome: the estimate for this outcome is lower soon after its occurrence than it is several trials afterward. 25 That is, participants not only estimated the probabilities as different from trial to trial, but they did so in a consistent way, predicted by the use of CAB-k rules.
The dark curve in Figure 8 presents participants' aggregate choice rates of the action option following different sequences of outcomes in the last 200 trials of each problem (the same trials for which the estimates were elicited). 26 It shows that participants chose the risky option more frequently one to five trials after the appearance of the bad outcome than 6 to 10 trials after its appearance. A comparison of the two curves in Figure 8 suggests that, perhaps as expected, the more likely participants estimated the occurrence of the bad outcome, the more likely they were to try to avoid it, by avoiding the gamble. Note that the dark curve in Figure  8 also points to the robustness of the results found in the previous section regarding the sequential dependencies in choice and the wavy recency effect of rare events.
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Contingent Average and Trends
As mentioned previously, the contingent average model predicts the nonmonotonic impact of rare events, but does not capture the first part of the observed wavy recency effect: the initial short-term positive recency effect. In particular, the best fitting contingent average rule (CAB-k i with K ϭ 14) predicts least sensitivity to the rare event in the very first trial after it occurs, but the experimental choice curves in Figure 7 (and, in fact, in Figure 8 as well) reveal that people behave as if they are least sensitive to the rare event exactly three trials after it occurs. For example, analysis of the data in Problem 1 (Ϫ10, .1; ϩ1) suggests that action is more attractive after the sequence LGG (action rate of 68%) than after the sequences GLG and GGG (action rates of 66% and 57% respectively). 28 This observation implies that the subjects are more likely to act after observing a trend of increasing payoffs from action. Indeed, past studies have shown that people expect a recent trend of change in the outcomes to persist (see, e.g., Barberis, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Restle & Brown, 1970) . One plausible explanation for this sensitivity to trends of change in outcomes involves the hypothesis that people believe that the environment is more dynamic than we previously assumed and consists not only of repeated regularities, but also of sudden trends that one better respond to as promptly as possible. One environment in which this belief is likely to be accurate involves social interactions with delayed outcomes in which the early adopters can make a future large profit (see a related setting in Phillips, Hertwig, Kareev, & Avrahami, 2014) . Specifically, consider a real-estate investment decision: Agents who quickly spot a trend and invest in an up-and-coming neighborhood could reap hefty profits.
29 Our computational analysis focuses on situations in which future payoffs do not depend on current choices, but the subjects behave as if they believe that the reaction to a trend is likely to increase future payoffs.
We now provide the simplest generalization of the contingent average model enabling a reaction to trends of change. We say that a set of outcomes consists of a trend of change if, when a linear regression is run on that set, the estimated slope is different from zero. The generalized model assumes that if the last three (a fixed parameter of the model) outcomes consist of a trend, then with probability Ն 0 (a free parameter), the decision maker responds to the trend by selecting the option that was best after the environment changed (i.e., selects the option that had a higher payoff in the very last trial).
30 Otherwise (with probability 1 -if the last three trials imply a trend is available, or with certainty if they do not imply it), the decision maker relies on a CAB-k i rule, with k i 24 When one has prior beliefs that the setting is dynamic, but does not know the nature of these dynamics, it is nearly impossible to learn that the setting is static. Spurious random patterns (which appear in static settings as well) can always be taken as supportive evidence for some type of dynamic structure, thus "unlearning" this prior dynamic belief is very difficult. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that although very slowly, participants did learn that the environment is static. For example, though in Trials 201-300 the median number of different estimates was 10, in Trials 301-400 it was only seven. 25 Note also that in all cases, there seems to be overestimation of the rare event: its actual probability is .15, but the minimal estimate in Figure 8 is .18. This overestimation in judgment might be attributed to random errors, which lead to regression to the mean (Erev, Wallsten, & Budescu, 1994) . 26 Both curves in Figure 8 are aggregate results from all four problems in Table 7 combined. (Recall only 20 participants faced each problem.) 27 Barron and Yechiam (2009) found only positive recency effects in the choice task, but they only analyzed the choice rate contingent on the very last outcome. 28 More examples for this wavier-than-expected pattern (specifically, minimal sensitivity to the rare event three trials after it occurs), demonstrating its robustness across problems and within problems, are shown in Appendix B. 29 Note that in such settings, it makes sense to select a risky option even if the immediate outcomes are negative to obtain positive future outcomes. CAB-k rules maximize immediate outcomes, and are likely to fail in these settings. 30 The size of the set of recent outcomes that could imply a trend of change is a fixed (rather than free) parameter of the model as it emerges from the qualitative features observed in the data. The value of 3 is implied both by the observed minimal sensitivity to rare events three trials after it occurs and by analysis of sequential dependencies in probability learning tasks to be discussed later. Note. Problems 3 and 4 were published in Barron and Yechiam (2009) . Problems 5 and 6 were run but were not published in that article. Each problem was faced by 20 participants for 400 trials. In the final 200 trials participants had to estimate the probability for the low outcome before making a choice. Participants received feedback from both the safe and the risky options following each choice.
uniformly selected from the set 1 . . ., K. We call this model the contingent average and trend (CAT) model. 31 Note that the implementation of the trend assumption can also be thought of as agents' consideration of the current trial as most similar to the very last trial (and thus choosing the alternative that worked best in that trial). We return to this point ahead.
We estimated CAT's two free parameters to fit the aggregate action choice rates in Problem 1 and Problem 2 (the statistics from Table 6 ). The values obtained are K ϭ 14 and ϭ 0.24. The aggregate mean choice rates, both predicted by CAT and observed in the data, are presented in Figure 9 . The figure also presents the predicted and observed choice rates contingent on recent sequences of 10 outcomes that include at most one rare event. A comparison between the predictions of the model and the experimental data shows that CAT captures all the following qualitative phenomena: (a) underweighting of rare events in the aggregate; (b) decreasing sensitivity to the rare event (positive recency) one to three trials after the rare event; (c) increasing sensitivity to the rare event (negative recency), starting three trials after the rare event; and (d) long-term positive impact for the rare event. CAT's quantitative fit is also high: its MSD from the 22 contingent choice rates is 0.0099 (compared with 0.0128 before adding sensitivity to trends).
Wavy Recency, the Gambler's Fallacy, and Probability Learning
The wavy recency effect closely relates to old findings in the probability learning literature, commonly attributed to the gambler's fallacy: the belief that after a long run of identical events, it becomes less likely that the run will persist. For example, a belief that after several consecutive black outcomes in a roulette table, red is more likely to appear. Jarvik (1951) first identified the gambler's fallacy, or a negative recency effect, in a probability learning task. His main findings were then replicated in many experiments in these settings (see Lee, 1971 , for a review, and a recent clarification in Ayton & Fischer, 2004) . The common analysis is illustrated by the dark curve in Figure 10 that summarizes data adopted from Bereby-Meyer and Erev's (1998) probability learning study (see Figure 2) . The curve presents the guessing rate of the more frequent of two events, "F," as a function of the number of trials since the most recent less likely event "R." The common finding in these settings is a nonmonotonic recency function similar to the wavy recency effect of rare events in binary choice tasks. The proportion of F guesses (F-rate) increases from 62% immediately after R to 83% three trials after R (i.e., after the sequence RFF), but then it decreases to 76% (after RFFF, RFFFF, and RFFFFF), implying negative recency. Notice however, that inconsistent with the gambler's fallacy assertion, after longer sequences of consecutive Fs, the F-rate increases. For example, after nine consecutive Fs (i.e., 10 trials after R), the F-rate is 88%.
Our study suggests that albeit related, the two recency phenomena (i.e., the wavy recency effect of rare events and the nonmonotonic recency effect in probability learning tasks) are not one and the same. To illustrate the relationship between the two phenomena, we performed two types of analyses. The first analysis, summarized by the light curve in Figure 10 , highlights a possible similarity between the phenomena's underlying processes. It shows that CAT, with the same parameters that capture the wavy recency effect of rare events (i.e., K ϭ 14 and ϭ 0.24, estimated based on the statistics presented in Table 6 ), also captures the classical findings from probability learning tasks (including an aggregate F-rate that implies a bias toward probability matching).
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The second analysis uses more data than the first and clarifies the difference between the two phenomena. Figure 11 presents the 31 There is no need to actually run a regression on the last three trials to check for the possibility of a trend: if the last of the three outcomes is different from the first, then by definition a trend of change exists. 32 The model, designed to capture behavior in binary choice settings, had to first be applied also to probability learning settings, but this is straightforward: In a contingent average mode, the model still selects the alternative (guessing Event F or guessing Event R) with the higher average payoff in a set of relevant experiences (determined by sequences of outcomes). In a trend of change mode, the model still observes the last three outcomes in which a possible change occurred and chooses the option that occurred after the change. Figure 8 . Participants' estimations for the probability of appearance of the rare low outcome, and their choice rates for the risky option, following sequences of 10 outcomes with no more than one rare event. Data is adopted from Barron and Yechiam (2009) . Data presented is the aggregate of the four problems, each with rare event's probability of .15, for Trials 201-400 in each problem (the trials in which estimation data was gathered). Curves are given with 95% CI for the mean. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
long-term sensitivity to the occurrence of a rare event in three problems, Problems 1 and 2 and the probability learning task. The figure shows that the minimal sensitivity to the rare event is observed three trials after the event occurs in all three problems. However, the timing of the maximal sensitivity differs: In the probability learning task, the maximal impact is immediate, but in the rare event choice tasks, the maximal impact is very much delayed (by 15 and 22 trials in Problem 1 and Problem 2, respectively). There are many differences between the choice task in Problems 1 and 2 and the probability learning task from Figure 2 that can account for the observed difference between the recency phenomena: the difference between choosing and guessing, the difference between problems with safe prospects and problems without them, the absence or existence of a dominant strategy, the different (relative or absolute) payoff magnitudes of the outcomes, and the difference in the probability of the less likely event (10% in Problems 1 and 2, and 30% in the probability learning task). Our model, CAT, which captures patterns of choice in both tasks, suggests that the latter difference is the critical one. According to CAT's contingent average mode, the sensitivity to a rare event gradually increases in the first K trials after it is observed because the rare event becomes less likely to be part of the most recent k i outcomes (and thus decrease the sample size and imply underweighting of the rare event). Therefore, the maximal sensitivity to a rare event is expected around (K ϩ 1) trials after it occurs. However, a 30% chance event is not sufficiently rare to decrease the sample size even if it is part of the most recent k i outcomes. As a result, under the contingent average mode, the sensitivity to a 30% chance outcome does not increase with time (and specifically, in the K trials that follow it), thus the difference in the curves' peak locations.
The timing of the minimal sensitivity is similar in both types of problems according to CAT, because the model's trend of change mode accounts for an initial (three-trial) decrease in the sensitivity to an event regardless of the event's probability. For example, in a probability learning task, immediately after R the trend mode (if activated) implies an R guess, but three trials after R (and when the most recent outcome was 'F') the trend mode implies an 'F' guess. Then, four trials after 'R,' the implied sensitivity is unaffected by the trend mode. Hence, the model suggests that the negative recency observed in probability learning tasks three trials after R is a result of the response to trends in the last three outcomes.
Zigzag Pattern
The long-term type of analysis provides yet another indication for the use of contingent average rules. The model's predicted sensitivity curves in Figure 11 show an interesting zigzag pattern, especially in the first 14 trials (recall, K ϭ 14). According to this pattern, the sensitivity to the rare event increases an even number of trials after it occurs (relative to the sensitivity to the rare event an odd number of trials after it occurs). For example, Figure 11b shows that, given a rare ϩ 10 in trial t, the predicted choice rate in trial (t ϩ 4) is larger than the predicted choice rates in both trials (t ϩ 3) and (t ϩ 5), and in general the predicted choice rate in trial (t ϩ 2n) is larger than the predicted choice rates in both trials (t ϩ 2n -1) and (t ϩ 2n ϩ 1). A more detailed investigation of this This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
uncommon pattern is beyond the scope of this paper and will be given elsewhere, but one should note that this prediction is a property of the contingent average mode of the model. The observed choice rates are clearly much noisier, but if people behave as if they use contingent average rules, we should observe a tendency for a zigzag pattern. In each of the three problems from Figure 11 , we compared, for each of the first 20 trials after the rare (or less likely) event, the observed choice rate in trial (t ϩ 2n) with the observed choice rates in trial (t ϩ 2n -1) and trial (t ϩ 2n ϩ 1), given a less likely outcome in trial t. Out of a total of 60 comparisons of this kind, 43 (72%) were consistent with the predicted zigzag pattern, and in each problem individually, at least 60% of the comparisons were consistent with this pattern.
Similarity-Based Decision Making
The contingent average rules we present closely relate to Skinner's (1953) assertion that behavior is selected by the contingencies of reinforcements. This assertion is modeled here with the assumption that people select the alternative that led to the best payoff in similar past experiences (see similar ideas in Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1995; Gonzalez, Lerch, & Lebiere, 2003) . The main shortcoming of the contingencies of reinforcements view is the fact that discovering the similarity functions that drive behavior, and thus deriving clear predictions of behavior, is hard. Our analysis addresses this shortcoming in three related ways. First, it shows that in the context of basic decisions from experience and probability learning tasks, the main effect of the tendency to rely on similar past experiences can be captured with a model assuming two classes of similarity criteria: Sequence-based similarity (under the contingent average mode), and temporal similarity (under the trend mode). Second, it suggests that in the current context, the role of temporal similarity is weaker than assumed by discounted average models. Finally, and most generally, our analysis shows that similarity based reasoning can lead to reliance on small samples.
It is important to emphasize that the sequence-based and the temporal-based similarity criteria assumed by CAT are only two of the many similarity criteria people can use. For example, the couple making the restaurant decision did not rely on the sequence of recent visits to the restaurant to identify similar experiences, but on the day of the week. Moreover, people can generalize experiences from other settings altogether (i.e., may consider as similar experiences from domains other than the current task). For instance, in making the restaurant decision, the couple could have taken into account past visits to other Italian restaurants. Another possible example for generalizations from different settings is implicit in CAT's trend mode. This mode implies temporal similarity (best reply to the most recent outcome), and the conditions under which the best reply option is selected are assumed to depend on the recent trend. We conjecture that this behavior is the result of reliance on experiences that occurred outside the task's domain. That is, in some trials, the decision appears most similar to past experiences from situations from outside the laboratory, in which responding to trends of change was the best alternative (e.g., social interactions with delayed outcomes). As CAT's trend of change mode induces the negative recency effect in probability learning tasks, this "generalization" conjecture is consistent with Estes's (1964) claim that the observed negative recency pattern in these tasks is the result of a habit carried over from real life into the lab.
The conjecture that CAT's two modes represent two distinct similarity functions suggests that even in settings of very limited information (like the clicking paradigm), people may use several forms of similarity. This analysis raises the question of the way people determine the type of similarity function to use in different settings. We hope to address this question with more length in Figure 10 . Experimental and predicted F-rates in the first 100 trials of the probability learning problem from Figure 2 , as a function of the number of trials since the most recent "R," and the aggregate means. For example, the data-points corresponding to three and five trials after R mean the F-rate after the sequence RFF and RFFFF, respectively. Experimental data (given with 95% CI for the mean) is averaged for the first 100 trials for each of the 70 participants in Bereby-Meyer and . The probability of the frequent event, "F," was .7. Five experimental conditions (two run as pilot) varied only in the payoffs associated with an accurate or inaccurate guess and did not differ qualitatively from one another. CAT is a contingent average and trend model with the parameters K ϭ 14 and ϭ 0.24. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
future research. For now, we make three remarks in this matter. First, it is reasonable to expect that the more experience people have with a task, the more they would rely on within-task experiences. The importance of similarity functions that generalize experiences from other settings should then diminish. Indeed, there is some evidence (e.g., Derks, 1962 ) that in a probability learning task, negative recency effects fade out with long experience.
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CAT attributes these effects to the trend of change mode that may result from relying on experiences from outside the task's setting. Although the likelihood of following trends of change in CAT was approximated with a free parameter, it is possible that this likelihood decays with experience. Second, we believe people were evolved to be highly sensitive to environmental signals that are ecologically rational, that is that are robust and effective. For example, using sequences of recent outcomes as signals that imply the current state in limited information settings (and possibly in many natural settings as well) can be very useful; therefore people are likely to follow them in determining which past experiences are similar to the current decision. In other words, we do not think people identify the best similarity function to use in each and every setting they face. Rather, they tend to use functions that work reasonably well in many settings and are relatively robust to various underlying structures.
Last, when a certain signal is both salient and reliable, people would probably easily learn to follow it, neglecting any other similarity functions they might otherwise have used. A thought experiment clarifies this point. Consider the same setting as that described in Figure 1 (Problem 1, with the clicking paradigm) with the addition of a reliable red-color warning signal: Prior to each trial in which the action button generates a Ϫ10 loss, the button changes its color to red. We can safely assume that people will quickly learn to follow the color signal and will ignore any possible sequential patterns or trends of change. Similarly, in settings with repeating simple deterministic 33 The data we analyzed (adopted from Bereby-Meyer & Erev, 1998) also shows almost no negative recency effects in the final block of 100 trials (of the 500 trials) of the experiment. (c) Figure 11 . Experimental and predicted sensitivity to the less frequent event, as a function of the number of trials after the event. Sensitivity in trial (t ϩ n) to an event that occurred in trial t is the difference between the proportion of best-reply choices to the event in trial (t ϩ n) and the aggregate mean proportion of best-reply. In Problem 1 (a), best-reply to the rare (bad) event is avoiding the gamble; in Problem 2, (b) best-reply to the rare (good) event is taking the gamble; and in the probability learning problem (c), best-reply to R is guessing R. The results are for Trials 51-100 of each problem. CAT is a contingent average and trend model with the parameters, K ϭ 14 and ϭ 0.24. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
sequences, people learn to follow them and there is no evidence for the chasing of trends of change. That is, the addition of salient and highly reliable signals to the environment would probably eliminate any initial tendencies toward specific similarity functions that people ordinarily use in that environment.
Relationship to Other Similarity-Based Models
Our analysis of contingent average rules resembles a memory system adaptation framework proposed by Schooler (1991, 2000) called rational analysis of memory. According to this framework, a particular memory is retrieved in a particular context if the expected gain from its retrieval is higher than the cost of retrieval. The expected gain is determined by the value of the memory and its assigned need probability, the probability of being relevant to the current task, which is a function of the history and the current context. Choice behavior and memory retrieval are different processes (although the former includes the latter), but the corollary to our analysis is clear; one can think of contingent average rules as the metafunction that sets a need probability of a particular past experience (in our case to either zero or one). Moreover, similarly to our argument that contingent average rules can be very effective in a wide class of settings, Anderson and Schooler (1991) show that their framework of memory retrieval is ecologically adaptive in the sense that it is congruent with statistical structures prevalent in natural environments.
More directly related to our work is a learning and decision making theory called instance-based learning theory (IBLT) proposed by Gonzalez, Lerch, and Lebiere (2003) . IBLT assumes that decision making is based on the storage and retrieval of instances of past decisions. Each stored instance includes the decision made, the outcome (or utility) from making the decision, and the environmental setting, or the situation, in which the decision took place. Then, when an agent faces a decision problem, some instances are retrieved from memory, and the alternative with the highest weighted average of utilities from the retrieved instances is selected. An activation mechanism, borrowed from Anderson and Lebiere's ACT-R theory of cognition (1998, 2003) determines an instance's probability of retrieval and the weight it is given in the choice stage. An instance is more activated the more recently and frequently it occurred, and the more similar it is to the current situation. This activation mechanism builds upon the rational analysis of memory (Anderson & Schooler, 2000) .
The CAT model can be described as one possible implementation of IBLT. Other implementations of IBLT designed to capture behavior in decisions from experience paradigms have been shown to have good descriptive value (Gonzalez & Dutt, 2011; Lejarraga, Dutt, & Gonzalez, 2012) . Moreover, similarly to CAT, an IBLT-based model that won the Technion choice prediction competition (Erev et al., 2010) also used sequence based reasoning in its definition of similarity. However, CAT differs from these models (and from the rational analysis of memory on which the retrieval of instances is based) in two main ways. First, unlike CAT, these models assume that temporal proximity increases the likelihood of considering an experience as relevant. Our analysis shows a counterexample of this temporal proximity assumption. The observed contingent choice rates show a reversed effect of temporal proximity. For example, people behave as if they believe that a recent rare loss decreases the likelihood of another loss (except in the very first trials that follow the loss). A second difference involves the effect of the similarity scores on the final choice. IBLT assumes that past experiences are weighted according to a noisy function of their similarity to the current task. In contrast, CAT assumes a step function. Only the most similar past experiences drive each choice.
In addition to IBLT models, CAT can also be described as a simple implementation of another class of models, reinforcement learning models that incorporate similarity-based situation recognition process (Redish, Jensen, Johnson, & Kurth-Nelson, 2007 ; and see Dayan & Niv, 2008; Gershman, Blei, & Niv, 2010) . Like CAT, these models use environmental cues to identify the current situation and given the situation use an evaluation function for each of the possible alternatives. The highest-value alternative is then chosen. Unlike CAT, on the other hand, these models typically use sophisticated mechanics in both the classification stage and in the evaluation stage, possibly because they are normally used in more complex settings (e.g., settings without forgone payoff information).
We believe that the similarities of CAT to IBLT and to similaritybased reinforcement learning models are more important than the differences. The differences most likely reflect situation-specific properties of the experiments used to fit the different models (and some modeling preferences). The similarities, on the other hand, appear to reflect robust properties of human learning and decision making that are likely to drive behavior in many settings. These properties include a tendency to respond to past experiences in similar situations that implies reliance on small samples, near optimal behavior when the discovery of the current similarity function is feasible, and deviations from maximization that reflect underweighting of rare events when rare events are unpredictable.
Limitations of CAT
The CAT model provides useful quantitative predictions in tasks of decisions from experience and probability learning, both for the average choice rates and for sequential patterns. However, it has important limitations. The most obvious limitation is the post hoc nature of the trend mode. We based the contingent average mode on careful simulation analysis showing that this mode approximates the optimal behavior in a wide space of problems, and then added the trend mode just to fit the data. Thus, it is possible that unlike CAB-k rules, CAT does not prescribe ecologically reasonable behavior. To evaluate the significance of this limitation, we analyzed the fitted CAT model with and without the addition of the trend assumption (i.e., with K ϭ 14 and with equals either 0 or .24). The proportion of optimal choices in the original space we have considered diminished from 94% without the trend to 90% with it (90% optimal choices is still much greater than the best discounted average model). Hence, in this case, adding the trend assumption incurs a relatively minor cost. 34 It is thus still possible that CAT reflects an ecologically reasonable process: It performs relatively well (better than discounted average rule but not as good as the CAB-k rules) in the set of dynamic problems examined in our simulation analysis, and it is likely to perform better than CAB-k rules when quick reaction to trends is likely to increase future payoffs. Admittedly, our paper would have been more elegant if we did not have to add the trend, but we feel that 34 The magnitude of decrease in optimal choices as a result of adding sensitivity to trends was similar in other settings we have considered and for other values of K. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
the addition of the trend clarifies the relationship between the computational analysis and human behavior. A second limitation is the fact that the model is tailored to the set of problems we investigate: decisions between the status quo and a gamble that provides one of only two possible outcomes with full feedback information. Specifically, the restriction to binary payoffs seems especially confining, as the contingent average rules define similarity according to exactly matching sequences of outcomes. Hence, in settings with more possible payoffs (and especially when payoffs are continuous), the predictions of contingent average rules may be ill-defined. One possible solution for this problem is to have contingent average rules define similarity differently than complete identity, for example, by computing some generalization function (or a distance measure) between possible contingencies (see, e.g., Sutton & Barto, 1998) . However, identifying the generalization functions people may use in more general settings can be a very difficult task and will almost surely require the model to have additional free parameters. A second and much simpler solution to the multiple payoffs problem of CAT, is to have the model first transform all observed payoffs according to their sign (or according to the difference between the two alternatives) and then keep defining similarity according to complete identity. This type of transformation of the payoffs to binary perceptions of either "win" or "lose" is likely to be too extreme in some cases, but may well produce useful approximations of behavior in other cases. We leave for future research to examine which of these two extensions to CAT is more fruitful.
A third limitation of CAT is that the model was tested in settings of relatively short time-frames of 100 trials. Note that one implication for the definition of similarity used by the contingent average mode is that the number of experiences the model finds similar to the current decision increases with the number of experienced trials. Consequently, the model (with a fixed K) predicts a decrease in the tendency to underweight rare events with time. Pilot studies we held do not support this prediction: Facing the problem from Figure 1 , people underweighted the rare event in 60 of the final 100 trials of a 500-trials experiment. Two possible extensions enable CAT to capture such behavior. First, K may not be fixed. If the length of the sequence anchored on grows with experience, then the sample size can remain small even after many trials. Second, some limitation to the model's memory of past events may be implemented. For example, truncating memory to the last 100 trials would predict the inability to learn not to underweight the rare event. The latter, limited memory, extension seems more consistent with the majority of cognitive research, but it also implies an additional free parameter. Our personal modeling preference is for tractable and parsimonious models with as few free parameters as possible, but we again allow future research to conclude which extension to CAT is more useful.
Summary and Conclusions
Previous research suggests that many behavioral phenomena, including the bias toward probability matching (Estes, 1950; Grant et al., 1951) , and underweighting of rare events (Barron & Erev, 2003; Hertwig et al., 2004) , can be explained with the hypothesis that people rely on small sets of past experiences (e.g., Erev & Barron, 2005; Fiedler, 2000; Hertwig & Erev, 2009 ). Traditionally, reliance on small samples has been attributed to the costs relying on large amounts of information incur (see Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010) . Alternatively, previous studies also suggested that the tendency to rely on small samples emerged because it is adaptive. For instance, it can help detecting environmental change (McNamara & Houston, 1987) , and it can aid making better heuristic inferences (Schooler & Hertwig, 2005) . However, these studies typically investigated the merit of decaying memory. That is, the advantages of relying on the most recent set of experiences.
Our study begins with the purely theoretical observation that reliance on small samples can be adaptive even in dynamic settings in which one better not discount the past (i.e., when the probabilities of the different outcomes depends on the state of nature, and the changes between states can be described by a Markov chain). Best performance in these settings requires a cognitively demanding two-stage process: An initial evaluation of a wide set of past experiences to detect the similar ones (experiences that occurred under the current or a similar state of nature), and then reliance on these experiences to select the best alternative. When the information available to the decision makers is limited to the outcomes in previous trials, similarity can still be effectively estimated by the outcomes sequences that preceded each experience. Our computational analysis shows that the effort to judge similarity based on the outcome sequences (using contingencies based rules of size k, named CAB-k rules) is more effective than the effort to judge similarity based on temporal proximity that implies decaying memory. The advantage of CAB-k rules over rules that use temporal proximity is particularly large when the underlying Markov chain has a small number of states (when patterns of outcomes are more likely to emerge), but it also holds when the chain has a large number of states. Moreover, in the long term, the advantage of CAB-k holds even when the environment follows an autoregressive process of the type discounted average rules assume a priori.
The second part of our investigation examines the relationship between the theoretical results, summarized in preceding text, and human behavior. This analysis starts with the observation that previous experimental research have documented clear indications of sensitivity to sequential dependencies-of the type expected under the assumption that the agents use CAB-k rules-but the popular learning models tend to ignore these observations. This convention appears to reflect the assertion that the sequential dependencies are situation-specific habits that have limited implications, and the effort to capture them will result in models that are too complex to be useful. Our analysis questions this assertion. The first part of this analysis builds on the observation that the use of CAB-k rules predicts a wavy recency effect of rare events that violates the prediction of the popular learning models. Analysis of published data supports this prediction. Clear evidence for a wavy recency effect was found in choice behavior and in probability judgments.
In addition, the experimental results show that the observed impact of recent outcomes is wavier than predicted by CAB-k. For example, the examination of Problem 2 in Figure 11b shows that the reaction to a recent high rare outcome from a gamble is initially positive, then negative, then positive again, and finally, in the long term, it gradually diminishes. Specifically, the proportion of the gamble's choices is minimized three trials after the high outcome and maximized 15 trials after the high outcome. Our analysis suggests that this 4-segment wavy pattern can be captured with a two-free-parameter model, referred to as contingent average and This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
trend (CAT). The model assumes that the subjects follow CAB-k rules in most trials, but sometimes they exhibit sensitivity to trends. In addition to capturing the wavy recency pattern in problems with rare events, CAT correctly predicts a distinct threesegment wavy recency pattern in problems without rare events (see Figure 11c ) and captures the aggregate choice rates (which suggest underweighting of rare events and a bias toward probability matching) in both types of problems. To our surprise, CAT also correctly predicts an interesting zigzag pattern: the effect of an outcome is larger after an even number than after an odd number of trials. We believe that these results show that the effort to capture sensitivity to sequences can improve models of learning. It seems that some of the indications of sensitivity to patterns reflect robust properties of learning processes and not just situation specific habits. Thus, ignoring these observations leads to incorrect predictions of the recency pattern, and it is possible to capture these results with relatively simple models. For some intuition as to why sensitivity to sequential patterns emerged as a robust property of human learning, one should consider the sequential nature of language. Indeed, it is well known that a model predicting the next word in the sentence based only on its preceding two or three words can achieve solid performance (e.g., Goodman, 2001) . A recent study by Radinsky and Horvitz (2013) provides further intuition. They showed that some natural events tend to follow certain sequences of other events. For example, the likelihood of a cholera outbreak in an African country dramatically increases following a sequence of storms and droughts. In fact, Radinsky and Horvitz found that, much like contingent average rules, anchoring on past sequences of events one can predict events such as disease outbreaks and riots with surprising accuracy.
The implied importance of sensitivity to sequences in models of learning does not mean that people are sensitive only to sequences. Rather, this sensitivity has likely emerged in human behavior because it is ecologically rational: In many settings, classifying past experiences to either similar or dissimilar to the current decision according to sequences is effective. It is reasonable to assume that other robust similarity functions exist. Indeed, our conjecture is that the observed tendencies that called for the addition of a trend component to the model is a result of one such similarity function participants carry over from settings in real life into the lab. We hope to put this conjecture to test, as well as address the task of identifying other similarity functions and integrating them into basic learning models, in future research.
An additional theoretical implication of our study concerns the tradeoff between cognitive cost and economic efficiency. Mainstream research in behavioral economics focuses on situations in which high cognitive costs (and organisms' cognitive limitations) drive deviations from maximization (e.g., Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; Simon, 1955; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) . We show that decisions from experience in static settings reflect a different pattern. Instead of using the cognitively simple fictitious play rule that ensures maximization and requires the storage and adaptation of a single number, participants in these experiments behave as if they use cognitively demanding rules (like CAT) that require a large memory-base and lead to underweighting of rare events and a bias toward probability matching. The current analysis explains this observation with two refinements of the tradeoff assumption. First, we propose that the subjects behave as if they evaluate economic efficiency in a wide set of situations that includes both static and dynamic environments. Simple rules like fictitious play and basic reinforcement learning models, are less effective than contingent average rules in this wide set of situations. Second, our results suggest that the cognitive costs and limitations that affect decisions from experience are less severe than suggested by the observed maximization rate in studies that focus on static settings. The fact that people behave as if they rely on small samples of past experiences, does not imply that they cannot process more information. Rather, in many settings people behave as if they first process a large number of experiences to discover those that seem most similar to the current task, and only then decide based on the small sample of most similar past experiences. 35 Nevertheless, we do not suggest ignoring cognitive limitations altogether. Indeed, the fact that people underweight rare events even after obtaining ample experience with a task suggest that forgetting is still an important mechanism to consider in these settings. One promising direction for research is a proper integration of contingent average rules and the inevitable, but less stringent than assumed, cognitive constraints.
In contrast to the relatively sophisticated theoretical assertions we have made in the preceding text, we believe that the most important practical economic implications of the current analysis are rather simple. Specifically, our investigation suggests that the tendency to rely on small sets of past experiences is likely to be robust: It can be the product of laziness or adaptive mechanisms of cognitive limitations (as suggested in previous research), but it is also expected when the agents are of high motivations and of high cognitive ability. That is, the deviations from maximization implied by reliance on small samples, like underweighting of rare events, are likely to be robust and should be considered in mechanism design (see Erev & Roth, 2014) . 35 Although memory for events that occurred many trials back as required by CAT might seem beyond the capabilities of normal human beings, there exists evidence to suggest otherwise. For example, a recent study of a perceptual-motor sequence learning task suggests that participants can be sensitive to experiences that last occurred up to 80 trials ago (Sanchez & Reber, 2012) . Table B1 presents 24 problems taken from previous studies. All problems were played for 100 trials using the clicking paradigm described in Figure 1 in the main text. The sources of the problem are NE (Nevo & Erev, 2012) , TAE (Teodorescu et al., 2013) , EH (Erev & Haruvy, 2009 ) and EEY (Erev, Ert, & Yechiam, 2008) . This latter paper focused on problems without forgone payoffs. The EEY problems described as follows, which included forgone payoffs (as all problems in our study), were run as pilot.
To the left are the problem's parameters and to the right are experimental results. The three right columns of the table show scores representing the impact of the outcome at trial t on the choice 1, 3, and 12 trials after observing this outcome. Impact scores are calculated as the proportion of action choices after observing the high action outcome minus the proportion of action choices after observing the low action outcome. We denote ImpactN as the average impact of the outcome at trial t on the choice at trial t ϩ n. For example, in the first problem in the table, Impact1 is the difference between the action-rate immediately after a ϩ10, and the action-rate immediately after Ϫ1. Similarly, Impact3 in this problem is the difference between the action-rate three trials after a "ϩ10" and the action-rate three trials after "Ϫ1". These scores were computed based on the impact of the first 88 outcomes (for t ϭ 1 to 88).
(Appendices continue)
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. Table B1 shows the robustness of the wavy recency pattern: The initial positive effect (Impact1 Ͼ 0) was observed in 23 of the 24 problems. Negative effect after three trials (Impact3 Ͻ 0) was observed in 18 of the 24 problems. In addition, the second peak in the impact curves (Impact12 Ͼ Impact3), was observed in 22 of the 24 Problems. Figure B1 shows impact curves of trials 1-44 (orange) and trials 45-88 (purple) over the next 12 trials for the 24 problems presented in Table B1 . Problems 1-13 (dashed lines) are problems which include a rare event and problems 14-24 (solid lines) are problems without rare outcomes. The curves show that during the first 100 trials the deep at t ϩ 3 does not diminish. In fact, Impact3 is lower for the later outcomes. Figure B1 . Impact curves in 24 problems from published studies, in the first block (orange) and second block (purple). S refers to the status quo option and R refers to the risky action option. For example, the first problem is a choice between zero with certainty and 10 with probability .1, Ϫ1 otherwise. Impact is computed as the difference between the choice rate contingent on a gain at trial t and the choice rate contingent on a loss at trial t. See the online article for the color version of this figure. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
